# Threat Model## Assets- NFT ownership records- token balances and approvals- collection metadata URI- collection mint authority- owner/admin authority## Threats and mitigations| Threat | Mitigation ||---|---|| Unauthorized minting | `onlyOwner` || Unauthorized transfer | owner/approval/operator checks || Approval persistence after transfer | approval is cleared || Zero-address ownership | explicit address validation || Invalid token references | `ownerOf` existence check || Malicious safe-transfer recipient | ERC-721 receiver handshake || Metadata redirection | owner-controlled URI is documented as a trust boundary || Lost admin key | operational key management required before deployment || Reentrancy through receiver | state is updated before receiver callback || Secret leakage | credentials excluded from repository |## Deployment assumptionsThe contract is **not production-audited**. Before mainnet deployment, perform fuzz/invariant testing, static analysis, dependency review, key-management review and an independent audit.## Known design tradeoffsThe current contract uses owner-controlled minting and base URI updates. This is intentionally simple for the first release. A production collection may require multisig administration, immutable metadata, supply limits, royalties, pausing, or a different mint authorization model.